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the state police are faced with a greater variety of situations than
federal officers were evidence such as that in Hayden is necessary
for a conviction."' It is further urged that if confessions are often
to be denied the state police and greater emphasis on scientific in-
vestigation is desirable, the police in the states should be allowed
maximum access to evidence in an otherwise lawful search."
HENRY C. McFADYEN, JR.
Constitutional Law-Illegal Search and Seizure-Injunction
Dissatisfied with the more common remedies for unlawful police
searches, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in Lankford v. Gelston,1 has added significant dimensions to the use
of the federal injunction. The case arises from the efforts of Balti-
more police to apprehend two Negroes suspected of killing a city
policeman. Possessing arrest warrants, but no search warrants, the
police entered more than three hundred homes within a period of
nineteen days. The searches, largely based on anonymous tips, were
conducted predominately in Negro neighborhoods. Plaintiffs, own-
ers of the homes searched, sought a temporary restraining order in
the federal district court against further searches. Jurisdiction was
based on section 1983 of the Judicial Code.2 Since the searches had
ceased and the police commissioner had issued a general order 3 pro-
hibiting further searches without probable cause, the court refused
relief.4
The court of appeals, however, was unimpressed with the gen-
eral order, primarily because it left determination of probable cause'
'
8 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J.
319, 327-32 (1962); Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of
Search and Seizure, 34 RocKY MT. L. REv. 150 (1962).
" Hayden v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647, 658 (1966).
'364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress."
Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
' For a full text of the order see 240 F. Supp. at 555 n.2 (1965).
'Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1965).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
to the individual officer and because it was not issued until the sus-
pects had apparently left town.' Noting the lack of other remedies
for the plaintiffs, the court reversed and ordered the district court
to enjoin the Baltimore police "from conducting a search of any
private house to effect the arrest of any person not known to reside
therein, whether with or without an arrest warrant, where the belief
that the person is on the premises is based only on an anonymous tip
and hence without probable cause."7
The Lankford case, then, offers an interesting basis for an analy-
sis of federal injunctions limiting state police activity. It should
be noted that when state remedies are sufficient to protect an indi-
vidual's constitutional rights the federal courts are reluctant to inter-
fere, primarily because of an interest in harmony between state and
federal judicial systems.' In the recent Negro civil rights cases,
however, the courts have ignored considerations of comity by either
enjoining enforcement of segregation statutes9 or simply declaring
such statutes unconstitutional."0 And even in the face of the federal
anti-injunction statute,-" at least one court has allowed an injunc-
tion after the commencement of a state criminal prosecution."
In Lankford, no federal interference with a state judicial process
was involved, and in such a situation the considerations of comity
vanish. Moreover, if the conduct of the defendant is of a continuing
nature, the court will usually grant an injunction,'3 and sometimes
'The suspects were later apprehended in New York.
364 F.2d at 206. The unanimous opinion was written by Judge Sobeloff.
' See Wolfe v. City of Albany, 189 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ga. 1960)
where the court refused to grant an injunction against the enforcement of a
handbill distribution statute which plaintiffs claimed abridged their right of
freedom of speech. Relief was likewise denied in Douglas v. City of Jean-
nette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) where the plaintiffs contended that a similar
ordinance restricted their freedom of religion.
'Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963).
" Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958); Browder v. Gayle,
142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), zff'd 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
1 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1965) provides: "A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as ex-
pressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of itsjurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
" United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 850 (1963).
13 See, e.g., Local 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp.
620 (N.D. Ind. 1948), where police were enjoined from attendance at union
meetings, which conduct was held to violate the union's rights of free speech
and freedom of assembly, and Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga.
1947) where the court enjoined police from further violations of plaintiff's
right of due process after noting statements of the police that they intended
to do so.
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may even be held in error for abuse of discretion if it fails to do
so.14 But if the defendant's misconduct has ceased, as in Lankford,
the court must rely on more subtle considerations before granting
an injunction.
One of the most important of these considerations is the likeli-
hood of resumption of the conduct of the defendant. If events be-
yond his control have caused the cessation, the question will be moot
and an injunction unnecessary.' 5 If the cessation is voluntary on
the part of the defendant, the question still may be moot, 6 but
voluntary cessation is not alone enough to prevent an injunction.17
The power of the court to grant injunctive relief "survives discon-
tinuance of the illegal conduct,"' and the defendant must show
that "there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be re-
peated."" Moreover, courts have had to recognize that certain ex-
traneous factors may influence a defendant's choice of future con-
duct. For example, a firmly intrenched state policy of segregation
may make resumption of discrimination more likely and the need
for an injunction more acute." Related also to the defendant's con-
"' In Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 284 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1960)
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that since the plaintiff had proved
by undisputed evidence that he was being denied constitutional rights by
not being permitted to use airport waiting room facilities reserved for white
passengers, the district court had no discretion to deny a preliminary in-
junction. See also Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956). In that case the district court was held
to have abused its discretion by refusing to enjoin members of the board of
education from enforcing a policy of racial segregation. See note 20 infra
and accompanying text.
1United States v. Hamburg-American Co., 239 U.S. 466, 475-77 (1916).
See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 182 (1931).
"The slightest likelihood of resumption of notorious conduct will keep
the question from being moot. Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649,
657 (5th Cir. 1963). And the burden of the defendant to show mootness is
a heavy one. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
21 Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1944);
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 327 (1944); NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 179 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1950).
"United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). See also
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944); Goshen Mfg. Co. v. Myers Mfg.
Co., 242 U.S. 202 (1916).
" United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2dCir. 1945).C Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1963). In other cases
involving the civil rights of Negroes, dictum has indicated that plaintiffs are
entitled to an injunction as a matter of right. In Clemons v. Board of Educ.,
228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956), the court stated:
The single question which appears to divide us is what guidance, if
any, we should now give the district court as to the future exercise of
[Vol. 45
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duct is the nature and degree of harm that the conduct, if resumed,
could inflict upon the plaintiff. If the harm seems irreparable, as in
Lankford, an injunction will naturally be more likely to follow.
Thus, courts view a defendant's conduct with considerable suspicion
and require much more than mere voluntary cessation before refus-
ing an injunction: "Police protestations of repentance and reform
timed to anticipate or to blunt the force of a lawsuit offer insufficient
assurance that similar raids will not ensue when another aggravated
crime occurs."'"
Another important consideration concerning the advisability of
an injunction is the availability to the plaintiff of other remedies.
Other than the possibility of injunctive relief, a person is protected
from violation of his constitutional rights by two devices-the ex-
clusionary rule, whereby illegally obtained evidence is barred in a
criminal proceeding, and the civil suit for damages. Neither of
these remedies would have been useful in Lankford, as the court
there pointed out.2 Many excellent arguments have been made that
the exclusionary rule is of little deterrent value in any situation,23
and in Lankford the complete impotency of this remedy is even more
obvious. The exclusionary rule applies only at trial, the illegal
search having already occurred. Clearly if officers search a home
without a warrant and find nothing incriminating, the rule is of no
use at all to the victim of such a search.24
If the exclusionary rule has failed as a deterrent to unlawful
invasions of privacy, civil remedies have fared little better. The
right to sue a state official in federal court was clearly established
its jurisdiction. That question, I think unfortunately, must apparently
be cast in terms of whether or not there has been an 'abuse of discre-
tion.' Certainly there has been none in the popular concept of that
phrase.... But the law of Ohio and the Constitution of the United
States simply left no room for the [school] Board's action, whatever
motives the Board may have had. I think the appellants were clearly
entitled to injunctive relief as a matter of right in this case.
228 F.2d at 859.
21 364 F.2d at 203. See also United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y,
343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952).
22 364 F.2d at 202.
23The exclusionary rule places no personal sanction upon the policeman.
Even if the average policeman understood the rule, seldom will he notice
the final result of a violation. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchnnant?, 14
Am. U.L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1964).
I, rvine v. California, 237 U.S. 128, 136-137 (1954); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 181-182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See general-
ly Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493 (1952).
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by Monroe v. Pape.5 The Supreme Court there held that section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act26 provides such a civil remedy regard-
less of whether the plaintiff has exhausted other available remedies.
The case, involving unlawful search and seizure, construed such
police activity as under color of law for the purposes of section
1983.27 Though the reasoning in Monroe has been criticized,2 it is
clear that section 1983 presently provides for both injunctive relief
and money damages in a civil rights violation.' Nevertheless, the
utility of a private suit against a policeman remains extremely
doubtful. Even if a plaintiff should win a judgment, the personal
assets of most policemen will be insufficient for compensation, and,
in any event, the deterrent value of the suit for damages seems
slight at best.30
Viewing the Lankford situation in light of the foregoing dis-
cussion, the decision appears sound. Conspicuously, however, the
court ignored an important problem peculiar to the injunction, that
is, the severe penalty for its violation. A non-complying policeman
may face a heavy, arbitrary fine or even imprisonment. The deter-
rent effect is plain, but one must ask whether this remedy goes too
far by compromising effective law enforcement. If the Lankford
decision represents a trend toward wholesale injunctive relief in civil
rights violations, it is possible to foresee situations in which police-
men, for fear of a fine or imprisonment, will neglect conscientious
law enforcement. Unfortunately, the court in Lankford was faced
with only two choices. It could have either affirmed the lower court's
*"365 U.S. 167 (1961).
'o See note 2 supra.2TThe Monroe decision was based on the reasoning in Williams v. United
States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The court further held that a
municipal corporation was not liable to a civil suit under § 1983.
"8 Justice Frankfurter's lengthy dissent in the Monroe case is consistent
with his concurring opinion in Snowden v, Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 16 (1944):
"It [the jurisdictional problem] is not to be resolved by abstract considera-
tions such as the fact that every officer who proports to wield power con-
ferred by a state is pro tanto the state. Otherwise every illegal discrimina-
tion by a policeman on the beat would be state action for purpose of suit
in a federal court."
' Both of these remedies never appear to have been simultaneously
awarded; however, there seems to be no good reason why this could not
be done. See Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 839, 846-49 (1964).
'0 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-652 (1961); Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41, 42-44 (1949)(Murphy, J. dissenting); Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173, 182 (W.D.
Pa. 1965). See generally Editorial Note, 12 How. L.J. 285 (1966).
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decision, thereby denying any relief, or it could have granted an
injunction, a regrettably negative sanction. Considering the serious-
ness of the police conduct, the choice of the latter seems justified.
The point to be noted, however, is not whether the decision is
right or wrong. The real importance of this case is the fact that it
illustrates the disturbing lack of an adequate solution to the problem
of police-community relations. The recent riots in several large
American cities underscore the need for such a solution.31 The court
in Lankford felt that an injunction restricting police behavior would
solve the problem. 2 Perhaps the court was right in this particular
case, but it must be remembered that the wisdom of judicial control
of the police function has already been questioned; furthermore, an
injunction is only granted after an individual's rights have been
violated, and even then it is very limited in scope.
What is lacking is a positive, constructive answer to the problem.
Rather than subsequent censorship by the courts of police decisions,
perhaps the answer lies in increasing judicial responsibility in the
law enforcement process itself.3" Others have suggested legislative
action in this area, 4 while some feel that civilian participation in
the police function may be the answer. 5 Whatever action is ulti-
31 One writer attributes the present difficulties with the police function
to four major modern developments: (1) urbanization, (2) recent Supreme
Court civil rights decisions, (3) mass migration of Negroes to Northern
cities, and (4) the civil rights movement. Edwards, Order and Civil Liber-
ties: A Complex Role for the Police, 64 Mica. L. REv. 47 (1965).
2 "The sense of impending crisis in police-community relations persists,
and nothing would so directly ameliorate it as a judicial decree forbidding
the practices complained of." 364 F.2d at 204.
"' Greater fairness in law enforcement practices may result by requiring
that a judge, rather than an ordinary magistrate, should determine whether
arrest or search warrants should issue. See LaFave & Remington, Control-
ling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforce-
tment Decisions, 63 MicH. L. REv. 987 (1965).
", "If legislatures should enact their own ideas of what is reasonable in
the way of search and seizure, would the Supreme Court insist that it has
the exclusive right of definition, and declare the statutes invalid? . . . I can
only venture a guess that the Court would not invalidate such legislation.
• . ." Waite, Whose Rulesf The Problem of Improper Police Methods, 48
A.B.A.J. 1057, 1058 (1962). The writer is a former Professor of Law at
the University of Michigan and was a member of the Supreme Court's ad-
visory committee on the rules of criminal procedure.
" The Civilian Review Board, a controversial method of regulating police
conduct, has been adopted in a few American cities. It is interesting to note
that in the November 8, 1966 General Election, the residents of New York
City overwhelmingly voted against that city's existing Civilian Review
Board. For a further discussion of such independent review bodies see
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U.L. REv. 1 (1964).
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mately taken to eliminate police-community hostility, it is important
that it be taken now. Otherwise, the future may offer an increasing
number of cases like Lankford v. Gelston.
D. J. JONES, JR.
Constitutional Law-Power of Legislature to Disqualify
Members-Elect
Julian Bond, representative-elect to the Georgia General Assem-
bly, was not allowed to take the oath of office on the first day of the
session. Challenges to his qualifications were referred to a special
committee, that held hearings and recommended that he not be
seated. The House approved the recommendation and denied Bond
his seat. In Bond v. Floyd,1 Bond and two members of his constit-
uency sought to enjoin the exclusion. The three-judge District
Court, one judge dissenting, upheld the House action as a reasonable
exercise of its power to judge the qualifications of its members.
It found the House justified in declaring the strong anti-war state-
ment of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, which
Bond supported and expanded on,' repugnant to the oath required
of House members to support the federal constitution. Thus, there
was no denial of due process.
The dissent did not reach the federal constitutional issues. Con-
struing the power of the House to judge the qualifications of its
members as limited to the qualifications specifically mentioned in
the state constitution,3 it would hold the House action void as in
violation of that constitution. The majority thought this a "restric-
tive view, unfounded in recognized authority."4  Both opinions
turned to the federal Congress for legislative precedents.
'251 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ga. 1966) reversed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4038
(U.S. Dec. 5, 1966). See note 75 infra.
2 Id. at 336, 337. The SNCC statement opposed the war aid declared
support for men who would not respond to the draft, calling for a "freedom
fight" at home as an alternative. Bond asserted that he fully supported the
statement, and added that he was a pacifist who admired the courage of
draft-card burners.
8 GA. CONsT. art. III, § VII, para. 1. This provision is substantially the
same as U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5. The qualifications mentioned in the Georgia
Constitution are citizenship, residency, age, no former conviction of a crime
of moral turpitude, and no holding of a civil or military office at the time
of election.
'251 F. Supp. at 340.
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